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Abstract: In a relatively recent strand of case law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
established the duty for national courts to apply EU consumer law ex officio, due to the
weak position the consumer is deemed to hold vis-à-vis the seller or supplier. This
development has to be seen in the context of the decentralized enforcement of EU
(consumer) law and the procedural autonomy of the Member States. However com-
mendable the outcome in this type of cases may be, the way the ECJ finds its decision is
often not entirely logical. It is argued that this is also the case in the recent judgment in
KdG/Kuijpers, which dealt with default proceedings before judicial courts. This article
examines the reasoning in the Advocate General’s (AG) opinion and the ECJ’s judg-
ment. It will become clear that there seem to be some loose ends in both. It is not the
purpose of this contribution to provide for an overarching theoretical scheme that
covers all of the Court’s case law concerning procedural autonomy or the ex officio
application of EU (consumer) law. The sole aim is to pinpoint some oddities. This is
necessary if we want to check whether the law in books and the law in action coincide
with one another, and if so, to what extent that is the case.
1. Introduction
1. Since the Océano Grupo decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(ECJ) has continuously extended the doctrine of ex officio application of consumer
law. The types of procedural settings in which the ECJ applied such an assessment
have increased. The case that will be discussed here deals inter alia with the
question (i) whether a national court that has to render a judgment in default
against a consumer has the possibility/the obligation to assess of its own motion
whether the contract containing the clause upon which the claim is based falls
within the scope of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) and (ii) if so,
whether the clause is unfair. As will be shown, the outcome lies completely in the
line of expectations. In addition, the ECJ’s reasoning does not add something new,
though that may be considered less positive.
* I would like to express my sincere gratitude to prof. dr. Reinhard Steennot and prof. dr. Piet
Taelman for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this contribution. Any faults or
inconsistencies that may remain are entirely my own responsibility. The final version of this
casenote was submitted on 22 October 2018.
** PhD Candidate Ghent University, Faculty of Law and Criminology, Department of
Interdisciplinary Study of Law, Private Law and Business Law. Master of Laws, Ghent
University, 2017. Email: Jarich.Werbrouck@UGent.be.
European Review of Private Law 1-2019 [135–158] © 2019 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands.
135
In the following parts, I will first discuss the facts of the case (2.), the Advocate
General’s opinion (3.) and the Court’s judgment (4.). The preliminary question, the
AG’s opinion and the actual decision will subsequently be analysed more thoroughly in
the commentary section (5.). This contribution ends with some concluding remarks (6.).
2. Facts of the Case
2. The case concerns a female student, Mrs Kuijpers, who failed to pay a total sum of
1.546 euros to Karel de Grote Hogeschool (KdG), a university college. This sum
constituted her registration fees for two academic years and the costs related to a
study trip. The school urged her to pay the entire amount, though she argued that she
was unable to pay the full sum at once. She eventually agreed to a payment plan
proposed by the school’s social facilities, according to which she had to pay a fixed
monthly sum over a period of eight months. Some months later, however, and despite
having received a letter of formal notice, she failed to pay the monthly instalment as
foreseen by the payment plan. Consequently, KdG summoned her before the Justice of
the Peace (vrederechter, juge de paix) of Antwerp, seeking to obtain the principal sum
of 1.546 euros, together with default interest at 10% per annum (269,81 euros) and a
costs indemnity (154,60 euros) as foreseen by the payment plan. Mrs. Kuijpers did not
appear before the court, nor was she represented.
3. The national court upheld KdG’s claim with regard to the principal sum. The
court, however, did not agree with the claimant’s allegation that Mrs. Kuijpers also
had to pay the interests and costs indemnity, given the potential unfair nature of
the applicable clause in case of non-payment. According to Article 806 of the
Belgian Judicial Code (BJC), however, the court was required to uphold KdG’s
claim in total given the non-appearance of Mrs. Kuijpers, unless the legal proce-
dure or the claim is contrary to public policy.1 Against this background, the
national court decided to stay the proceedings and to refer inter alia2 the following
question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling:
1 It should be noted that Art. 806 BJC has been amended once again. In addition to an obligatory ex
officio public policy control, the court can also invoke ex officio those rules of law that grant judges an
ex officio power (e.g. Art. 1231 Belgian Civil Code, stating that the court may moderate excessive
indemnification clauses). Recently, the Belgian Constitutional Court found Art. 806 BJC to be in
accordance with Arts 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution, holding the principle of equal treatment
(Grondwettelijk Hof 7 June 2018, www.const-court.be/public/n/2018/2018-072n.pdf).
2 The other questions concerned (1) whether or not the KdG, being a free educational establishment
which provides subsidized tuition, should be regarded as an undertaking within the meaning of EU
Law, (2) whether or not the contract between a consumer and a free subsidized educational
establishment relating to the provision of subsidized tuition by that establishment falls within
the scope of Directive 93/13 (UCTD) and (3) whether or not the free educational establishment
which provides the aforementioned tuition should be regarded as a seller or supplier within the
meaning of that directive.
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Does a national court, when a claim is lodged with it against a consumer in relation
to the performance of a contract and that court, under national procedural rules, has
the power only to examine of its own motion whether the claim is contrary to
mandatory national rules, have the power to examine in the same manner, of its
own motion, even if the consumer does not appear at the hearing, whether the
contract in question comes within the scope of [Directive 93/13] as implemented in
Belgian law?
3. Opinion of the Advocate General
4. Advocate General Sharpston begins her opinion by recalling that it is settled
case law that a national court is under the obligation to examine ex officio whether
a term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer falls
within the scope of the UCTD and, if so, whether such term is unfair. The
relevance of the case at hand, however, lies in the assessment whether this still
applies when the consumer has not at all taken part in the proceedings.3
In order to carry out such assessment, the AG pinpoints three principles that
should be taken into account.4 First of all, the system of protection provided by the
UCTD is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the
seller or supplier, as regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge.
This leads to the consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in advance without being
able to influence the content of those terms. Second, the provision that unfair
terms are not binding on the consumer (Article 6 UCTD) is a mandatory provision.
It aims to replace the formal balance the contract establishes between the rights
and obligations of the parties with an effective balance, re-establishing the equality
between them. This provision must be regarded as one of equal standing to national
rules which rank within the domestic legal system as rules of public policy. The
assessment of whether or not the UCTD is applicable to a given situation logically
precedes that analysis. Third, the imbalance that exists between the consumer and
the seller or supplier can only be properly remedied by positive action, uncon-
nected with the actual parties to the contract. That positive action consists of a
court or tribunal’s ex officio analysis of the question whether a contract falls within
the scope of the UCTD and of the fairness of its terms. The protection conferred on
consumers by that directive extends to cases in which the consumer did not raise
the unfair nature of the term, be it as a consequence of the unawareness of his
rights or of the deterrent effect of costs of judicial proceedings.
The AG subsequently discusses the well-known principle of procedural
autonomy, along with its equally well-known limitations – the principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness –, to guide the procedural rules that make the
3 Opinion AG Sharpston 30 November 2017, paras 20–21.
4 Opinion AG Sharpston 30 November 2017, paras 22–25 and the references there.
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aforementioned positive action possible.5 In the light thereof, she examines case
law of the Court to identify some underlying principles.6 These can be summarized
as follows. The principle of effectiveness does not require the national judicial
system to intervene where none of the parties to a contract has brought proceed-
ings before the national courts. If proceedings have been brought, those courts
must examine, of their own motion, in all cases and whatever the rules of their
domestic law, whether a contract falls within the scope of the UCTD. If it does, they
must also of their own motion examine the fairness of that contract’s terms. The
mandatory nature of the rules laid down in the directive means that they must be
applied irrespective of the status afforded to the national rules implementing them
by the national legal order and of the parties’ procedural actions or submissions.
The fact the consumer was not the party initiating the proceedings, that he did not
appear at the hearing or that he did not invoke the UCTD does, according to the
AG, not alter this conclusion.7
Finally, the AG assesses Article 806 BJC in light of the aforementioned
principles. She points out that, at first sight, Belgian legislation allowing courts to
examine of their own motion only whether a claim is contrary to national rules of
public policy, without being entitled to consider at the same time whether the claim
in question contravenes the principles laid down in the UCTD, could appear proble-
matic. Subsequently, however, she turns to the duty of harmonious interpretation,
stating that where the national court has the power under national law to examine ex
officio the validity of a legal measure in the light of national rules of public policy, it
must also exercise that power regarding EU rules of mandatory nature, in accordance
with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. As a consequence thereof, the
AG considers that under Article 806 BJC the national court is obliged to assess ex
officio whether a clause is unfair in the light of the UCTD in the same way as it does
so for national rules of public policy.8 She concludes that ‘a national court has the
power and the obligation to examine of its own motion whether a contract comes
within the scope of [the UCTD], even where it has not been specifically requested to
do so, inter alia because the consumer has not taken part in the proceedings’.9
5 Opinion AG Sharpston 30 November 2017, para 26.
6 Opinion AG Sharpston 30 November 2017, paras 27–32, referring to ECJ 6 October 2009, ECLI:
EU:C:2009:615, Asturcom, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-40/08, ECJ 9 November 2010,
ECLI:EU:C:2010:659, Pénzügyi Lízing, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-137/08, ECJ 14
June 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:349, Banco Español, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-618/10
and ECJ 1 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:637, ERSTE Bank Hungary, curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?num=C-32/14.
7 Opinion AG Sharpston 30 November 2017, paras 33–34.
8 Opinion AG Sharpston 30 November 2017, paras 35–36. This approach was already advocated by
Professor Reinhard Steennot. See R. STEENNOT, ‘De bescherming van de consument door het Hof
van Justitie: een brug te ver?’, TPR (Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht) 2017(1), pp 123 and 132.
9 Opinion AG Sharpston 30 November 2017, para 37.
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4. Judgment of the Court
5. The ECJ begins its judgment by referring to the same principles as the AG, be
it in a less extensive manner.10
In view of these considerations, the Court recalls that national courts
are under an obligation to assess ex officio whether a contractual term is unfair
and to correct the imbalance which exists between the consumer and seller or
supplier.11 Pursuant to this obligation, the national court, as a preliminary
matter, has to examine whether the contract containing the term which is at
the basis of the claim falls within the scope of application of the UCTD.12
These obligations are necessary to ensure that the consumer enjoys effective
protection as provided for by the UCTD, especially in the light of the real risk
that the consumer is unaware of his rights or encounters difficulties in enfor-
cing them. Consequently, the protection offered by the UCTD to consumers
extends on the one hand to cases in which the consumer does not call upon the
fact that the contract falls within the scope of that directive. On the other
hand, the consumer would also be protected in cases where he fails to raise the
unfair nature of a term contained in a contract which he concluded with a
seller or a supplier, be it due to his unawareness of his rights or because he is
deterred from enforcing them on account of the costs which judicial proceed-
ings would involve.13
Regarding the implementation of these obligations by a national court giving
judgment in default, the ECJ refers to the aforementioned principle of procedural
10 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, paras 26–28. The ECJ, however, on the one hand does not
refer to Asturcom and ERSTE Bank Hungary, yet on the other hand refers to ECJ 7 November
2014, ECLI:EU:T:2014:938, Banco Santader, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-399/11, ECJ
26 January 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:60, Banco Primus, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-421/
14 and ECJ 29 November 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:252, Sales Sinués and Drame Ba, curia.europa.
eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-381/14.
11 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, para 29, referring to ECJ 26 October 2006, ECLI:EU:
C:2006:675, Mostaza Claro, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-168/05 and ECJ 21 February
2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:88, Banif Plus Bank, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-472/11.
12 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, para 30, referring to Pénzügyi Lízing and (by analogy) ECJ 4
June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:357, Faber, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-497/13. The latter
case concerned not the ex officio assessment whether a contract as a whole or a contractual clause
therein falls within the scope of the UCTD, but the assessment by the national court of its own
motion whether a buyer may be considered as a consumer in the meaning of that directive.
13 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, paras 31–32, referring to Mostaza Claro and ECJ 16
November 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:685, Pohotovost’, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-76/
10. The English translation of the Court’s judgment only mentions the failure of the consumer
to raise the unfair nature of the term. However, as the language of the case was Dutch, and thus
only the Dutch version of the judgment is authentic (Art. 41 Rules of Procedure of the Court of
Justice), it is necessary to emphasize here that the Court also extends the protection to cases in
which the consumer did not call upon the fact that the contract falls within the scope of the UCTD.
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autonomy together with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.14 Whereas
normally the principle of effectiveness is at the centre of attention,15 in this judg-
ment the Court only engages with the principle of equivalence. As to the latter, the
ECJ recalls that Article 6 UCTD is a mandatory provision, which must be regarded as
a provision of equal standing to national rules of public policy. This classification
extends to all provisions of the directive that are essential to attain the objective
pursued by Article 6 UCTD. It follows that, where the national court has the power
under national procedural law to examine ex officio whether a claim is contrary to
national rules of public policy,16 it must also exercise that power for the purposes of
assessing of its own motion whether the disputed term on which the claim is based
and the contract containing the term fall within the scope of the UCTD and, if so,
whether that term is unfair, such in the light of the criteria laid down in that
directive.17 The Court subsequently answers the question of the referring court by
pointing out that the UCTD must be interpreted as meaning that a national court
giving judgment in default and which has the power, under national procedural rules,
to examine of its own motion whether the term upon which the claim is based is
contrary to national public policy rules, is required to examine of its own motion
whether the contract containing that term falls within the scope of that directive and,
if so, whether that term is unfair.
5. Comments
6. In this commentary section, I will first examine the formulation of the pre-
liminary question (5.1.), before assessing the reasoning in the AG’s opinion (5.2.1.)
and the Court’s judgment (5.2.2.). Finally, this section will consider what is (not)
new in the judgment (5.3.).
14 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, para 33, referring (by analogy) to ECJ 30 May 2013, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:341, Asbeek Brusse, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-488/11. The latter case did not con-
cern default proceedings, but the ex officio assessment by the court in appellate proceedings. This may
explain why, erroneously, the English translation refers to appellate proceedings, thereby indicating that
the system concerning the translation of official EU documents should be reassessed (infra).
15 P. CRAIG & G. DE BÚRCA, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials – Sixth Edition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 6th edn 2015), p 246; J. KROMMENDIJK, ‘Is there light on the horizon? The
distinction between ‘Rewe effectiveness’ and the principle of effective judicial protection in
Article 47 of the Charter after Orizzonte’, 53. CMLR (Common Market Law Review) 2016(5),
p 1402; M. BOBEK, ‘Why There Is No Principle of ‘Procedural Autonomy’ of the Member States’ in
H.-W. Micklitz & B. De Witte (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the
Member States (Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland: Intersentia 2012), p 315; S. PRECHAL, Directives in
EC Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), p 138.
16 This is the case in the Belgian judicial system for a court giving judgment in default, as is apparent
from the information provided in the order for reference.
17 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, paras 34–36, referring to Asbeek Brusse.
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5.1. The Formulation and Interpretation of the Preliminary Question
7. The first issue that will be discussed is the way the preliminary question was
formulated, along with the way the AG and the ECJ interpreted and answered it.
5.1.1. Mere Possibility or Obligation to Examine Ex Officio?
8. According to the English version of the referred question, the national court has
‘the power’ to carry out a public policy control. The referring court, however, was the
Justice of the Peace of Antwerp, who adjudicated the case in Dutch. This means that
the case’s authentic language is also Dutch.18 The Dutch wording of the question reads
that the national court under national law has ‘de bevoegdheid’ to assess if a claim
lodged before it is contrary to national rules of public policy. There are two possible
ways to interpret this concept. The first one being in the non-legal, common meaning,
the other one being in the legal sense (to be more precise in a Hohfeldian scheme).
9. On the one hand, one can assume that the referring court had the intent to use
the concept ‘bevoegdheid’ in its common, non-legal meaning. Within this meaning,
someone has the possibility to do something without, however, being obliged to do
so. It will be shown that in the context of the ex officio application of (consumer)
law, the dichotomy between the mere possibility of a court to act of its own motion
and the obligation to do so is important and has already been addressed by the
ECJ.19 It thus follows that the uncertainty concerning the (non-) existence of an
obligation in this meaning of the word ‘bevoegdheid’ is problematic.
10. On the other hand, one may also see ‘bevoegdheid’ within a Hohfeldian, sub-
jective rights-scheme. According to this scheme, which has been transposed in the
Belgian legal context by Professor Walter Van Gerven half a century ago, the correct
translation of ‘bevoegdheid’ should have been ‘authority’. The concept of ‘authority’
implies that the holder of the right not only can commit the action to which the right
entitles him (de macht, the power), but also that he is allowed to do so (de faculteit, the
faculty). The concept ‘power’, however, only indicates whether or not the holder can
or cannot behave in a specific way. It does not affect the question whether or not he
was allowed to do so.20 Thus, it follows from a Hohfeldian point of view that the
18 Supra, fn. 13.
19 See also the analysis in H.B. KRANS, Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht en materieel EU-recht
(Deventer: Wolters Kluwer 2010), pp 38–41.
20 W. HOHFELD, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, 23. Yale
L.J. (Yale Law Journal) 1913(1), pp 44–54; W. SEAVEY, ‘The Rationale of Agency’, 29. Yale L.J.
1920(8), pp 860–861; A. CORBIN, ‘Legal Analysis and Terminology’, 29. Yale L.J. 1919(2), p 167.
See in Belgian context W. VAN GERVEN, ‘Een nieuwe analyse van het begrip “Recht”, - De “Juristic
Conceptions” theorie’, 24. RW (Rechtskundig Weekblad) 1960–1961(42), pp 2046–2048. The
Hohfeldian scheme distinguishes different types of subjective rights, each having their own specific
consequences concerning the obligations they create.
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translation of the referred question was wrong. Instead of referring to ‘the power’, it
should have referred to ‘the authority’.
11. From a Hohfeldian perspective, however, the English translation might be a
better representation of the legal reality than the original Dutch formulation. An
authority can be seen as the sum of a power and a faculty, and this last concept entails
the absence of legal constraint (i.e. the mere possibility for the holder, allowing him to
do as he sees fit).21 The wording of the referring court could thus be interpreted as if
the court is not under an obligation to conduct the ex officio public policy assessment,
but has the freedom to choose whether or not to do so.22 This also seems to be the
interpretation the ECJ gives to Article 806 BJC in the KdG/Kuijpers judgment. The
ECJ holds that when a national court has the power under national procedural rules to
examine of its own motion as to whether the term upon which the claim is based is
contrary to public policy, it is required to examine of its own motion whether the
contract containing the term falls within the scope of the UCTD and, if so, whether
that term is unfair.23 In Belgian case law and doctrine, it is established and well-
accepted though that the national court has the obligation (and not the mere possibi-
lity) to carry out a public policy control in default cases.24 This was also emphasized by
the Belgian Government during the proceedings before the ECJ.25 Likewise, AG
Sharpston considered the ex officio assessment under Article 806 BJC to be an
21 W. VAN GERVEN, 24. RW 1960–1961(42), p 2045.
22 A. WALLERMAN, ‘Towards An EU Law Doctrine On The Exercise Of Discretion In National Courts?
The Member States’ Self-Imposed Limits On National Procedural Autonomy’, 53. CMLR 2016(2),
p 343 under reference to A. BARAK, Judicial Discretion (New Haven: Yale University Press 1989) p
7–12 and B. HESS, ‘Juridical discretion’ in M. Storme and B. Hess (eds), Discretionary power of the
judge: limits and control (Mechelen: Kluwer 2003), p 46.
23 Judgment of the Court, para 37 as well as the actual dictum.
24 J.-F. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, ‘Traits essentiels des réformes de procédure civile “pots-pourris IV et V”’,
32. JT (Journal des Tribunaux) 2017, pp 635–636; P. THIRIAR, B. VANLERBERGHE, J. LAENENS,
D. SCHEERS & S. RUTTEN, Handboek Gerechtelijk Recht (Antwerp-Cambridge: Intersentia, 4th edn
2016), p 410; B. ALLEMEERSCH, P. VAN ORSHOVEN & S. VOET, Tussen gelijk hebben en gelijk krijgen
(Louvain-The Hague: Acco, 7th edn 2016), pp 288–289; B. MAES, P. VANLERSBERGHE, N. CLIJMANS & S.
VAN SCHEL, Gerechtelijk privaatrecht na de hervormingen van Potpourri I tot V (Bruges: die Keure
2017) pp 281–283; D. SCHEERS & P. THIRIAR, ‘Burgerlijk procesrecht na Potpourri V’, 81. RW 2017–
2018(19), p 729; S. MOSSELMANS, ‘Taak van de rechter bij verstek’, 80. RW 2016–2017(1), pp 14–15
(analysed case law) and pp 18–19; P. TAELMAN & T. DE JAEGER, ‘Actuele Topics Burgerlijk Procesrecht:
Potpourri & Rechtsplegingsvergoeding’ in M. Dambre & P. Lecocq (eds), Rechtskroniek voor de
vrede- en politierechters 2018/Chronique de droit à l’usage des juges de paix et de police 2018
(Bruges: die Keure 2018), pp 296–301; H. BOULARBAH & M.-C. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, ‘Artikel 806 Ger.
W.: Much Ado About Nothing?’ in J. Flo, L. Jansens & Vlaams Pleitgenootschap (eds), Smaakmakers
in het procesrecht (Antwerp-Cambridge: Intersentia 2016), p 137–139 (analysed case law) and pp 142.
See more specifically in the context of consumer protection law R. STEENNOT, ‘Ambtshalve toepassing
van de informatie-inwinningsverplichting van de kredietgever’, T.Vred./JJP (Tijdschrift van de
Vrederechters/Journal des Juges de Paix) 2017(11–12), p 576.
25 Opinion AG Sharpston, 30 November 2017, para 19.
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obligation, rather than a mere possibility.26 As the Hohfeldian concept ‘power’ (as
used in the English translation) says nothing about the presence or absence of legal
constraint on the holder of the right (i.e. the (non-) existence of an obligation to
commit the action to which the right entitles the holder),27 its use is more appropriate
than the notion ‘bevoegdheid’ (the Hohfeldian ‘authority’) as relied upon by the
referring court. The latter would imply a discretionary power of the national court to
determine whether or not to carry out an ex officio public policy control, whereas in
Belgian legal reality the national court is under the obligation to do so.
12. In sum, it becomes clear that both interpretations of the notion ‘bevoegdheid’ – the
commonmeaning of theword ‘power’ vs. theHohfeldianmeaning of ‘authority’ – are not
entirely flawless. The first interpretation gives, or at least could give, rise to confusion.
Though it is not necessarily wrong, it is not necessarily correct either, as there is a blind
spot concerning the (non-) existence of an obligation. The second interpretation is
nothing more and nothing less than wrong, since it would imply that the national court
can freely decide whether or not it will carry out the ex officio public policy assessment.
The wording of the question should have referred to the obligation of an ex officio
assessment, rather than the power to carry out such control. Such phrasing would
indisputably have correctly reflected (Belgian) legal reality.
5.1.2. Relevance of the Nature Under National Law
13. The need for a correct qualification of the nature of the ex officio public
policy assessment is twofold.
First, anyone who is not familiar with Belgian (procedural) law reading the
judgment of the Court might conclude that the ex officio public policy assessment has
an optional character under Belgian law. However, this is an incorrect conclusion, as
Belgian judges are obliged to conduct such an assessment.28 Moreover, there seems to
be such an obligation to some extent in all the European Member States.29
26 Opinion AG Sharpston, 30 November 2017, paras 36–37.
27 Note that ‘power’ in the Hohfeldian sense seems to coincide with the common meaning of the word
‘power’. This is not the case though for the concept ‘authority’, as the latter in the Hohfeldian
sense indicates the absence of legal restraint, where this could not necessarily be deduced from the
common meaning of the word ‘authority’.
28 See the references under fn. 24. See also B. HESS & P. TAELMAN, ‘Consumer Actions Before National
Courts’ in B. Hess & S. Law (eds), An Evaluation Study of National Procedural Laws and Practices in
Terms of their Impact on the Free Circulation of Judgments and on the Equivalence and Effectiveness of
the Procedural Protection of Consumers Under EU Consumer Law – Report Prepared by a Consortium
of European Universities Led by the MPI Luxembourg for Procedural Law as Commissioned by the
European Commission (JUST/2014/RCON/PR/CIVI/0082) – Strand 2. Procedural Protection of
Consumers (Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union 2017) Ch. 3, p (158) at 210.
29 B. HESS & P. TAELMAN in An evaluation study of national procedural laws and practices in terms of
their impact on the free circulation of judgments and on the equivalence and effectiveness of the
procedural protection of consumers under EU consumer law, pp 208 et seq.
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Second, and way more important, it may seem that the ECJ is conversing a
discretionary power of the national courts under domestic law into an obligation under
European law. The Court has not refrained to do so in several older judgments
either.30 According to Professor Anna Wallerman, the practise of transforming a
mere possibility into an obligation is another way in which the ECJ limits the proce-
dural autonomy of the Member States, thereby increasing the impact of EU law on the
national legal order of the Member States.31 As opposed to the traditional limitations
on the content of national rules imposed by the principles of equivalence and effec-
tiveness, this type of limitation deals with the way the rules are formulated.32 I will
later discuss the possible legal basis for such transformations as well as the short-
comings in the ECJ’s KdG/Kuijpers judgment. It should be noted here, however, that,
unabated the fact that in my opinion the Court engaged in this case with a wrong
reading of Belgian law as it seems to have started from the presumption that there is a
mere possibility (and not an obligation) to examine ex officio the compliance of the
term upon which the claim is based, and thus in this concrete case there is no
conversion from an possibility to an obligation, the judgment expresses in an unequi-
vocal way the willingness of the Court to intervene in a far-reaching way with the
national (procedural) legal order and the national procedural autonomy.33
5.2. Reasoning of the AG and the Court and Procedural Autonomy of
the Member States: Where does the Shoe Pinch?
14. As the end of the previous chapter preluded, I will now analyse the case
discussed in terms of procedural autonomy and its limitations. It should, however,
be stressed that I do not aim to propose an overarching and exhaustive scheme, as
there is a lack of space to do so here.34 Instead, I will focus on some (reoccurring)
30 Asturcom, para 54, where the Court held that ‘[t]he national court or tribunal is also under such an
obligation where, under the domestic legal system, it has a discretion whether to consider of its
own motion whether such a clause is in conflict with national rules of public policy’. Other cases
include ECJ 24 October 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:404, Kraaijeveld curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
num=C-72/95, paras 57, 58 and 60, ECJ 12 February 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:78, Kempter, curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-2/06, para 45, ECJ 30 May 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:340, Erika
Jőrös, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-397/11, Asbeek Brusse and Faber. See also in the
context of res judicata, ECJ 26 April 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:242, Invitel, curia.europa.eu/juris/
documents.jsf?num=C-472/10, para 41. See also R. STEENNOT, TPR 2017(1), p 129.
31 A. WALLERMAN, 53. CMLR 2016(2), pp 343 and 359.
32 A. WALLERMAN, 53. CMLR 2016(2), p 340.
33 This is nothing new. See in this regard C. PAVILLON, ‘ECJ 26 October 2006, Case C-168-05 Mostaza
Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL – The Unfair Contract Terms Directive: The ECJ’s Third
Intervention in Domestic Procedural Law’ in 24 ERPL (European Review of Private Law) 2007(5),
pp 741–744.
34 In this regard, it should be noted that there may be not such a thing as ‘an’ overarching and
exhaustive scheme. See in this same vein A. WALLERMAN, 53. CMLR 2016(2), p 342, fn. 10. E.g.
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inconsistencies in the Court’s reasoning. These inconsistencies may indicate that
the ECJ is not always following a conceptual well-developed framework, and some-
times rather works from some sort of gut feeling. This in turn complicates a
scientific legal analysis. That being said, it does not necessarily bring along that
the judgments the ECJ finds in this context are undesired.
5.2.1. The Rewe-based Opinion of the AG
15. In KdG/Kuijpers, AG Sharpston refers to the principle of procedural
autonomy.35 As is well-known, the principle was first established in two separate
judgments of 16 December 1976.36 As from that moment, there has been an
ongoing academic debate regarding the development of a conceptual framework
that can be used to explain and link the different judgments of the ECJ dealing with
procedural autonomy.37
where some authors seem to consider the so called ‘procedural rule of reason’, as stated for the first
time in ECJ 14 December 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:441, Van Schijndel, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.
jsf?num=C-430/93 and ECJ 14 December 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:437, Peterbroeck, curia.europa.
eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=312/93, as a global correction on the principles of equivalence and auton-
omy (and their sometimes unreasonable outcomes) (J.W. RUTGERS, ‘Ambtshalve toepassing van
Europees recht in het civiele geding’ in R.J.C. Flach, L.M. Klap-de Nooijer, J.W. Rutgers & E.M.
Wesseling-van Gent, Amice. Rutgers-bundel (Deventer: Kluwer 2005), p (295) at 296–297, others
see it only connected to the principle of effectiveness (S. PRECHAL, ‘Community Law In National
Courts: The Lessons From Van Schijndel’, 35. CMLR 1998(3), p 690 and J. KROMMENDIJK, 53.
CMLR 2016(5), pp 1406–1407). In my opinion, the latter view is the correct one, as the Court in
its judgments explicitly frames the procedural rule of reason within the assessment whether or not
the application of EU law is rendered practically impossible or excessively difficult (i.e. the
principle of effectiveness) (see Van Schijndel, para 19). Another aspect that has been subject to
extensive discussions in scholarship, is how the principle of effective judicial protection relates to
Rewe-effectiveness (see in this regard the short, yet speaking, overview in B. THORSON, Individual
rights in EU Law (Switserland: Springer International Publishing 2016), pp 17–18.
35 Opinion AG Sharpston, 30 November 2017, para 26.
36 ECJ 16 December 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:188, Rewe, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-33/
76, para 5, and ECJ 16 December 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:191, Comet, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.
jsf?num=C-45/76, para 13. However, it took until 2004 before the ECJ itself used the term for the
first time (ECJ 7 January 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:12,Wells, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-
201/02, para 65).
37 See e.g. S. PRECHAL & R. WIDDERSHOVEN, ‘Redefining the Relationship between ‘Rewe-effectiveness’
and Effective Judicial Protection’, 4. REALaw (Review of European Administrative Law) 2011(2),
pp 31–50; L.M. RAVO, ‘The role of the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in the EU and its
Impact on National Jurisdictions’ in EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste (ed.), Sources of Law and
Legal Protection (Trieste: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste 2012) pp 101–125; J. KROMMENDIJK, 53.
CMLR 2016(5), pp 1395–1418; T. EILMANSBERGER, ‘The Relationship Between Rights and Remedies
in EC Law: In Search of The Missing Link’, 41. CMLR 2004(5), pp 1199–1246; A. GERBRANDY, ‘Case
C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV, Vodafone Libertel NV
v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, Judgment of the Court (Third
Chamber) of 4 June 2009, not yet reported’, 47. CMLR 2010(4), pp 1199–1220. See more generally
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16. In the context of procedural autonomy, the AG refers to former case law of the
ECJ on the ex officio application of the UCTD to deduce what the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness require from the national procedural rules.38 It is
argued that the references to Asturcom, Banco Español de Crédito and ERSTE
Bank Hungary are appropriate, as in these cases the assessment of the effectiveness
of the national rules indeed took place in the broader analysis of the Rewe-mantra.39
On the contrary, however, the reference to Pénzügyi Lízing in the AG’s opinion
is somewhat odd. Nowhere in the latter judgment is there any reference to the
principle of procedural autonomy along with the Rewe-principles of equivalence and
effectiveness. Moreover, the Court held in Pénzügyi Lízing that ‘[i]n order to safeguard
the effectiveness of the consumer protection intended by the European Union legis-
lature, the national court must thus, in all cases and whatever the rules of its domestic
law, determine whether or not the contested term was individually negotiated between
a seller or supplier and a consumer’ (emphasis added).40 This actually shows that the
ECJ did not rely on the Rewe-effectiveness as a basis for its conclusions. The latter
intrinsically implies that an assessment has to be conducted as to whether or not the
national procedural rule renders the application of EU law practically impossible or
excessively difficult, implicitly entailing that it does matter what the rules of domestic
law prescribe. One can assume that this is a(nother) delusive formulation by the ECJ.
Alternatively, this wording may also deviate from the other three cited judgments as a
consequence of the different compositions of the treating chambers of the Court.41 It
should, however, be stressed that all actors involved (both the AG and the judges of the
ECJ) are per se outstanding jurists. This does not only follow from the criteria
contained in the TFEU to assure this (see in particular the Articles 253 and 254
TFEU),42 but also from the individual curriculum vitae of the AG and the judges.
Moreover, Pénzügyi Lízing was treated in grand chamber, thus even further
D.-U. GALETTA, Procedural Autonomy of EUMember States: Paradise Lost? (London: Springer 2010),
xvi+145 p. The expression of ‘connecting the dots’ was borrowed from M. BOBEK, ‘The Effects Of EU
Law In The National Legal Systems’ in C. Barnard & S. Peers (eds), European Union Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2017), p (143) at 168.
38 Opinion AG Sharpston, 30 November 2017, paras 27–33.
39 Asturcom, para 38, Banco Español, para 46 and ERSTE Bank Hungary, para 49. The term ‘Rewe-
mantra’ was first used by Prechal and Widdershoven (S. PRECHAL & R. WIDDERSHOVEN, 4. REALaw 2011
(2), p 33).
40 Pénzügyi Lízing, para 51. This consideration was repeated in the AG’s opinion in Kuijpers, para 30.
41 It is submitted that different chambers handle similar cases in different ways. See in this regard
J. KROMMENDIJK, 53. CMLR 2016(5), p 1418. Another related concern is that the somewhat (unsatis-
factory) reasoning in the Court’s judgments might reflect the compromise that had to be struck in
order to obtain a majority within a divided (chamber of the) Court (G. DE BÚRCA, ‘National Procedural
Rules And Remedies: The Changing Approach Of The Court Of Justice’ in J. Lonbay & A. Biondi,
Remedies for Breach of EC Law (New York: Wiley 1996), Ch. 4, p (37) at 45). See also below.
42 K. LENAERTS & P. VAN NUFFEL, European Union Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2011),
pp 536–537. See for a thorough, critical analysis also M. BOBEK (ed.), Selecting Europe’s
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minimizing the chance that the not-mentioning of the procedural autonomy along with
its limitations is due to conciseness or even forgetfulness of the Court. In my opinion,
a more plausible basis for the judgment of the Court in Pénzügyi Lízing and for the
AG’s conclusion in Kuijpers is the principle of effective judicial protection, and more
specific the principle of effective consumer protection.43 This also follows from the
reference to ‘the effectiveness of consumer protection’ in Pénzügyi Lízing,44 as
repeated in the AG’s conclusion.45 As rightly proposed by Professor Prechal and
Professor Widdershoven, the principle of effective judicial protection should be seen
separately from the Rewe-effectiveness.46 Be that as it may, it is clear that the mini-
mum requirements prescribed by the Rewe-effectiveness are not at the basis of the
Court’s findings in Pénzügyi Lízing.47 This in turn means that the AG has at least to
some degree wrongfully deduced the principles she proposes from the Rewe-effective-
ness, as one of the cases on which she bases them was issued in another context.
17. Another strange twist in the AG’s opinion, is the reference to the duty of
harmonious interpretation. AG Sharpston argues that Article 806 BJC only pre-
scribes an assessment of rules of public policy, and that it could possibly follow that
the national court might not be allowed to investigate whether the claim is contrary
to the principles laid down by the UCTD.48 It seems that the AG aims at the
hypothesis where in the national legal order of Member States the legislation
transposing the UCTD is not granted a public policy status.49 Subsequently, the
Judges: A Critical review of the appointment procedures to the European courts (New York:
Oxford University Press 2015), xi + 323 p.
43 As will be shown below, however, these two do not necessarily coincide, nor does the first
completely encompass the second.
44 Pénzügyi Lízing, para 51.
45 Opinion AG Sharpston, 30 November 2017, para 30.
46 S. PRECHAL & R. WIDDERSHOVEN, 4. REALaw 2011(2), p 50.
47 See in the regard that the Rewe-mantra (as prescribed by Prechal) is only the minimum minimorum
S. PRECHAL & R. WIDDERSHOVEN, 4. REALaw 2011(2), p 38; S. PRECHAL, 35. CMLR 1998(3), p 689;
A. WARD, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2007), p 87; R. SCHÜTZE, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 2016), pp 387–389; S. PRECHAL, Directives in EC Law, p 139.
48 Opinion AG Sharpston, 30 November 2017, para 35.
49 If it does, there would be no problem. In Belgium, for example, it is generally assumed that the
national rules concerning unfair contract terms are merely imperative law. This, however, does not
mean that national courts do not have to raise these rules of their own motion. See R. STEENNOT &
S. DEJONGHE, Handboek Consumentenbescherming en Handelspraktijken (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia
2007), pp 158–161; R. STEENNOT, Syllabus Consumentenbescherming (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia
2010), p 210. Some authors, however, have in the past argued that the rules concerning unfair
contract clauses are of public policy. See E. BALATE & T. BOURGOIGNIE, ‘Le traitement des clauses
abusives en droit belge: examen critique au regard du projet 826 sur les pratiques du commerce et sur
l’information et la protection du consommateur’, 1. TBH (Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht)
1989, p 655: ‘Le caractère d’ordre public autorise en outre que le moyen soit soulevé pour la
première fois devant la Cour de cassation.’ In its judgment of 26 May 2005, the Belgian Court of
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AG states that according to the principle of harmonious interpretation, ‘these rules
must be interpreted in accordance with EU law’ (emphasis added).50 When con-
ducting a textual analysis, the EU law to which she refers seems to be Article 6
UCTD, along with the interpretation given to it by the Court that it concerns a
provision of equal standing to national rules of public policy.51 In addition, the
AG’s use of ‘these rules’ might refer to national rules of public policy. According to
the AG, ‘national rules of public policy’, as mentioned in Article 806 BJC, might
thus also include the principles laid down by the UCTD. As such, in my opinion she
is in fact also saying that the national legislation transposing the principles laid
down in the UCTD should be considered as falling under the national concept of
public policy. It is difficult to understand why the AG uses such a complex
construction regarding the status the principles of the UCTD (and the accompany-
ing transposition legislation) should have in the national legal order to justify why
they should be taken into consideration ex officio, when merely two paragraphs
earlier she held that the ‘mandatory nature of the rules that [the UCTD] lays down
means that they must be applied irrespective of the status afforded to the national
rules implementing them by the national legal order and of the parties’ procedural
actions or submissions’ (emphasis added). The brief reference in paragraph 36 to
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness also seems somewhat artificial.
The importance of the identified distinction (between the Court holding that
certain provisions are of equal standing to national rules of public policy on the one
hand, and that certain provisions should be regarded as part of the national rules of
public policy on the other hand) lies in the full effect of the consequences which the
national legal orders of the Member States attribute to the public policy status.52 If, as
Cassation held that ‘[a]ttendu que la loi du 2 août 2002 relative à la publicité trompeuse et à la
publicité comparative, aux clauses abusives et aux contrats à distance en ce qui concerne les profes-
sions libérales, entrée en vigueur le 30 novembre 2002, a remplacé la loi du 3 avril 1997; [a]ttendu
qu’aucune de ces lois ne prévoit qu’elle s’applique aux contrats en cours; que leurs dispositions
concernant les clauses abusives ne sont pas d’ordre public’ (Cass. 26 May 2005, C.04.0215.F, jure.
juridat.just.fgov.be/view_decision.html?justel=F-20050526-4&idxc_id=200539&lang=FR). See also
G. GATHEM & J. LAFFINEUR, ‘Les clauses abusives dans les contract conclus entre les vendeurs et les
consommateurs’ in M. Coipel & P. Wéry (eds), Les pratiques du commerce, l’information et la protection
du consommateur – Commentaire de la loi du 14 juillet 1991 et de la loi du 2 août 2002 (Waterloo:
Wolters Kluwer 2006), p (217) at 291). See also the illuminating overview at I. DEMUYNCK, De
inhoudelijke controle van onrechtmatige bedingen (Gent: unpublished PhD. Dissertation 2000), pp
724–731.
50 Opinion AG Sharpston, 30 November 2017, para 36. See generally M. BOBEK in European Union
Law, p (140) at 153–158.
51 Opinion AG Sharpston, 30 November 2017, para 24, under reference to Asturcom.
52 It is not my aim to address the existence of and conditions under which a European public policy could/
should exist, nor do I want to carry out an analysis of the possibility of the Court to elevate certain rules to
(rules of equal standing to) national rules of public policy. See in this regard H. SCHEBESTA, ‘Does the
National Court Know European Law? A Note on Ex Officio Application after Asturcom’, 18. ERPL 2010
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the AG implicitly seems to indicate, the (national transposition of the) UCTD would
belong to national public policy, all consequences the national legal order attributes to
public policy rules should apply. This would not only mean that these rules should be
applied ex officio (this is what the Court seems to be willing to achieve) but also that the
nullity for a violation of these rules would be absolute. That would in turn mean that
parties cannot renounce from relying on it, and moreover, that the award of the nullity
would not depend on whether or not one of the parties made a claim to that end.53
However, as the Court has already made clear, the consumer can renounce from the
protection provided by the UCTD.54 This means that the interpretation the Court has in
mind for Article 6 UCTD does not completely correspond with (at least the Belgian)
national concept of nullity. Thus, the earlier case law of the Court seems to impede the
assertion that the (national implementation of the) UCTD is part of the national rules of
public policy.55, 56
5.2.2. The Reasoning of the European Court of Justice
18. As mentioned above, the Court starts from the same assumptions as the AG
with regard to the protection of consumers.57 As opposed to the AG, however, the
ECJ does not immediately turn to the principle of procedural autonomy. Instead, it
(4), pp 864–870; M. SØRENSEN, ‘In the Name of Effective Consumer Protection and Public Policy!’, 24.
ERPL 2016(5), pp 817–822; S. PRECHAL & N. SHELKOPLYAS, ‘National Procedures, Public Policy and EC
Law. From Van Schijndel to Eco Swiss and Beyond’, 12. ERPL 2004(5), pp 589–611.
53 Other national consequences may include the application of in pari causa turpitudinis cessat repititio and
the (possibly delayed) startingpoint of the limitationperiod (see e.g.Article 1304BCC). See in the context
of the UCTD: S. GEIREGAT, ‘Nietigheid en ‘meest gunstige interpretatie’: de remedies bij onrechtmatige
bedingen in consumentenovereenkomsten in het licht van de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie’, TPR
2016(1), pp 121–122. In Belgium and France, there is a distinction made between absolute and relative
nullity. Other Member States, including the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, distinguish between
‘nullity’ and ‘voidability’. See V. TRSTENJAK, ‘Procedural Aspects of European Consumer Protection Law
and the Case Law of the CJEU’, 21. ERPL 2013(2), pp 458–459 and the references there.
54 See in this regard ECJ 4 June 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:350, Pannon, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
num=C-243/08.
55 S. GEIREGAT, TPR 2016(1), p 168. Geiregat proposes to stop focussing on the traditional national
divisions. Instead, attention should be given to an autonomous European sanction. A related
question, however, is to which extent such a European sanction would conflict with the basic
ideas of procedural (and remedial) autonomy of the Member States.
56 Another speaking example of the ambivalent assessment of the Court of the public policy character
of certain Treaty-provisions relates to Art. 81 EC-Treaty (Art. 101 TFEU). In arbitration-related
matters, the Court held that this provision was of public policy (ECJ 1 June 1999, ECLI:EU:
C:1999:269, Eco Swiss, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-126/97), while in other contexts it
did not (ex officio application (Van Schijndel) and refusal to enforce foreign judgment (ECJ 11 May
2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:225, Renault, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-38/98)). See more
extensively S. PRECHAL & N. SHELKOPLYAS, 12. ERPL 2004(5), pp 602–605.
57 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, paras 26–28.
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relies on two obligations it already established in previous cases. First, the obligation for
the national court to assess of its own motion whether the contract containing the term
that is at the basis of the claim falls within the scope of application of the UCTD. Second,
the obligation for the national court to assess of its own motion whether a contractual
term is unfair and, if so, to correct the imbalance that exists between the consumer and
the seller or supplier. The Court considers these obligations necessary for ensuring that
consumers enjoy effective protection. The protection the UCTD confers on consumers
therefore also extends to cases in which the consumer did not raise the unfair nature of
the term.58 Only within this proposed framework, theMember States are, in the absence
of EU legislation, responsible for the procedural rules in respect of the implementation
of these obligations, within the limits of equivalence and effectiveness.59
19. When merely analysing the judgment, one might conclude that the Court
transformed a mere possibility of an ex officio-assessment into an obligation to conduct
such an assessment. Making abstraction of the fact that in reality there has always been
an obligation, and thus that the Court ipso facto could not transform a possibility into
an obligation, there also seems to be a problem with the Court’s reasoning behind the
transformation. The ECJ bases its reasoning on the principle of equivalence, according
to which the procedural rules governing proceedings to safeguard EU law may not be
less favourable than these governing similar domestic actions.60 What the Court is
doing here, however, is granting EU law better protection compared to domestic law,
(wrongfully) assuming that under national law there was a mere possibility for an ex
officio public policy assessment. The Court thus seems to interpret the prohibition of
negative discrimination of claims based on EU law as a basis for positive discrimination
of these claims. Admittedly, the principle of equivalence only prohibits a less favour-
able procedural treatment of claims based on EU law. As such, it does not explicitly
preclude a better treatment of claims based on EU law. However, the only consequence
attached to the principle of equivalence (what’s in a name?) is that the procedural
treatment of claims based on EU law has to be equal to that of domestic claims.61 It
cannot be at the basis of an alteration of Member States’ national procedural rules in
the direction of a uniform European standard.62 This also seems to correspond with
the Court’s case law that the principle of equivalence does not require the Member
States to extend their most favourable national regime to all actions based on EU law.63
58 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, paras 29–32.
59 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, para 33.
60 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, para 34.
61 See in the same vein A. WALLERMAN, 53. CMLR 2016(2), p 353; S. PRECHAL & N. SHELKOPLYAS, 12.
ERPL 2004(5), pp 590 and 593.
62 M. EBERS, ‘From Océano to Asturcom: Mandatory Consumer Law, Ex Officio Application of
European Union Law and Res Judicata’ in 18. ERPL 2010(4), p 839.
63 ECJ 15 September 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:401, Edis, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=c-231/
96, para 36; ECJ 1 December 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:577, Levez, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
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Consequently, one can argue that the transformation of a possibility into an obligation
cannot be based on an ordinary reading of the principle of equivalence, as the latter
requires that a claim based on EU law is treated in the same way as a similar claim
founded on national law.64
20. Now it is clear that the principle of equivalence cannot justify the conversion
of a possibility into an obligation, one can only wonder what could. Wallerman
proposes the principle of sincere co-operation, as enacted in Article 4 (3) TEU, as
the basis for such transformation.65 The fact that the Court nowhere explicitly
refers to this principle does not exclude this, as in other cases this was neither the
case.66
Another possible basis for the conversion of a possibility into an obliga-
tion could be the duty of the Member States to guarantee effective consumer
protection. This was even explicitly ruled by the Court.67 This principle of
effective consumer protection seems to be related to the principle of effective
judicial protection (PEJP), as enacted in Article 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Some argued that this might be
the key to allow positive intervention in the Member States to adjust their
national procedural rules.68 As such, this principle can explain how the Court
was able to impose an obligation on the national courts, rather than to just
leave their domestic legislation unapplied.69 However, it is submitted that the
num=C-326/96, para 42; ECJ 15 September 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:403, Ansaldo, curia.europa.
eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-279/96, paras 29–30. T. TRIDIMAS, ‘Enforcing Community Rights in
National Courts: Some Recent Developments’ in C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz & P. Skidmore, The
Future of Remedies in Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2000), p (35) at 39–41; D.-U. GALETTA,
Procedural Autonomy of EU Member States: Paradise Lost?, p 25.
64 S. PRECHAL & N. SHELKOPLYAS, 12. ERPL 2004(5), pp 590–591; M. SØRENSEN, 24. ERPL 2016(5),
pp 810 and 817. The ECJ also seems to indicate this, see e.g. Faber, para 39.
65 A. WALLERMAN, 53. CMLR 2016(2), pp 339 and 353.
66 A. WALLERMAN, 53. CMLR 2016(2), pp 339 and 353.
67 Judgment of the Court, 17 May 2018, para 31. See however infra. The Court first refers to effective
consumer protection to deduce two obligations, but then refers to the principle of procedural
autonomy when assessing the question of how these two obligations should be applied. The ECJ
presented the concept of effective consumer protection for the first time in Océano Grupo (ECJ 27
June 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:346, Océano Grupo, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-240/98,
para 26). Since then, the Court has iterated it on several occasions (e.g. ECJ 21 November 2002,
ECLI:EU:C:2002:705, Cofidis, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-473/00, para 33, Mostaza
Claro, para 28 and Pohotovost’, para 42).
68 S. PRECHAL & R. WIDDERSHOVEN, 4. REALaw 2011(2), p 41.
69 The latter being the consequence of the negative obligation which the PEJP brings along, and
which according to some is the only consequence underlying the Rewe-effectiveness due to the
latter’s negative formulation. See S. PRECHAL & R. WIDDERSHOVEN, 4. REALaw 2011(2), pp 40–42;
J. KROMMENDIJK, 53. CMLR 2016(5), p 1405. This also explains why it is unlikely that such
transformation is based upon Rewe-effectiveness. See in this regard A. WALLERMAN, 53. CMLR
2016(2), pp 351–352.
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principle of effective consumer protection does not completely fall under the
umbrella of the PEJP. The expanded interest in the role Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) can play in consumer disputes illustrates that an effective
consumer protection can also be guaranteed through extrajudicial means.70
Whatever may be the exact relationship between the principle of effective
judicial protection and the need to guarantee an effective consumer protec-
tion, it seems at least to some extent clear that these two principles both might
justify an active, positive intervention.71 This is the case, because their main
objective lies in guaranteeing that individuals can usefully rely on their Union
rights (positive formulation) rather than making sure individuals are not pre-
vented by domestic law to do so (negative formulation).
It should, however, be stressed that the abovementioned explanations for
the conversion are somewhat preposterous in the given situation. They are all based
on the assumption that national courts merely had a possibility of an ex officio
public policy-assessment, and not an obligation. As mentioned before, this is not
the case. All Member States are (at least to some extent) familiar with the obliga-
tion to assess ex officio compatibility with national rules of public policy, as the
latter are deemed to be so essential for the good arrangement and functioning of
society, that one cannot tolerate any derogations.72 This public policy character
may be apparent from legislation or case law, though it does not find its right of
existence in these sources. Rather, the latter follows from the concerns that play at
a certain moment within a certain community. It follows from the fundamental
character of the concerns which rules of public policy represent that it is in a
democratic society not up to the legislative power to determine on a discretionary
basis whether it will assign a mere possibility or an obligation on the national
70 See more extensively CH. Hodges, I. Benöhr & N. Creutzfeldt-Banda (eds), Consumer ADR in
Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2012), xxxv + 479 p.; P. CORTÈS, The New Regulatory Framework
for Consumer Dispute Resolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016), xxviii + 471 p. See for an
assessment of the situation within the twenty-eight Member States of the European Union CH.
HODGES, ‘Consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution’ in An evaluation study of national procedural
laws and practices in terms of their impact on the free circulation of judgments and on the
equivalence and effectiveness of the procedural protection of consumers under EU consumer law,
Ch. 5, pp 280–311. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, there is in Article 81 (2) (g) TFEU also an explicit
basis for the power of the Union to meddle in the development of alternative methods of dispute
settlement.
71 A. ANCERY & M. WISSINK, ‘ECJ 4 Juni 2009, Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Györfi’, 18.
ERPL 2010(2), p 312.
72 G. VERSCHELDEN & P. TAELMAN, Basisbegrippen van recht (Leuven: Acco 2017), p 39. This definition
is only one of the possible ways to circumscribe the concept ‘public policy’. Another way to put it
could be that rules of public policy concern the essential interests of the State or the community or,
in private law, the legal foundations upon which the economic or moral order of society rest (R. DE
CORTE, B. DE GROOTE & D. BRULOOT, Privaatrecht in hoofdlijnen – Vol. 2 (Antwerp-Cambridge:
Intersentia 2017), p 249).
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courts to assess compatibility with these rules of their own motion. Similarly, it is
not up to the judiciary to decide not to apply rules of public policy. Such (double)
discretionary power, however, is a necessary requirement for argumentations con-
cerning the transposition from a possibility to an obligation, as given above.
21. Another interesting model was proposed in this journal by Professor Marie
Sørensen. She attempted to create a step-by-step flowchart derived from the ECJ’s
case law on the ex officio application of consumer law.73 The scheme consists of
four steps. First, the Court needs to assess whether a particular directive is inspired
by the main ideas concerning the protective stance towards consumers (step 1). If
this is the case, the Court advances to the ‘procedural rule of reason’, where the
battle between the effectiveness of EU law and the procedural autonomy of the
Member States is fought (step 2). If this clash turns out in the advantage of the
effectiveness of EU law, the latter should be applied of the court’s own motion. If
this is not the case,74 the schedule continues. In the next step, the Court examines
whether the relevant EU provision can be regarded as being of equal standing to
national rules of public policy (step 3). Finally, the Court will conclude whether it
can or must be applied ex officio, in accordance with the principle of equivalence
(step 4).
Although I do not aim to carry out an in-depth analysis of Professor
Sørensen’s model, the Court’s judgment in Kuijpers is an excellent opportunity to
briefly verify it. The first step is fulfilled as the Court explicitly refers to the basic
ideas underlying consumer protection.75 According to the second step, the Court
needs to address the procedural rule of reason. However, an analysis of the judg-
ment shows that the Court immediately turns to step 3, assessing the application of
the principle of equivalence in conjunction with the public policy character. This by
itself is not necessarily a problem. Sørensen notes that the ECJ already skipped
some of the steps in previous decisions.76 Yet, this seems more problematic in the
KDG/Kuijpers case. As was mentioned above, the third step only comes into play
when the procedural rule of reason ended up in the demise of the principle of
73 M. SØRENSEN, 24. ERPL 2016(5), pp 797–798.
74 Sørensen gives the example of res judicata, under reference to Asturcom, to prove that the
principle of effectiveness not always gets the overhand on national procedural autonomy.
M. SØRENSEN, 24. ERPL 2016(5), p 809.
75 These basic ideas include that (i) the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller in terms of
bargaining power and level of knowledge, (ii) the formal balance established in the contract has to
be replaced with an effective balance, re-establishing equality between the two parties, (iii)
imbalance between the consumer and the seller can only be corrected by positive action uncon-
nected with the actual parties to the contract, (iv) there is a real risk that the consumer is unaware
of his rights or encounters difficulties in enforcing them and (v) the means must be adequate and
effective to ensure that the rights laid down in Articles 6 and 7 of the UCTD are protected. See the
Court’s judgment, paras 26–28.
76 M. SØRENSEN, 24. ERPL 2016(5), pp 798–799 and the references over there.
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effectiveness. Consequently, one may assume that the interests that underlie the
national provision at issue (Article 806 BJC) justify the restriction on the effective-
ness of EU law. However, in Kuijpers this seems to be unlikely. Pursuant to the
travaux préparatoires, the ratio legis of Article 806 BJC is the reform of civil
procedure in light of the more general concern for a more efficient judicial
administration, without loss of quality. The Belgian legislator’s aim was to limit
the courts’ workload in default cases by focussing on the essence. The gain of time
could then be used in the battle against the judicial backlog in cases where all
parties are present on the day fixed for the hearing.77 In the ECJ’s older case law,
however, the Court was not very avid to favour a swift administration of justice over
the effectiveness of consumer protection law.78 According to Professor Sørensen’s
scheme, the Court’s assessment of the ex officio application would have had to stop
after the second step (in favour of an obligation on the national courts to examine
of their own motion), rather than completely ignoring it.
5.3. The Judgment of the Court: What’s New?
22. As to the actual decision of the Court, namely that even in default proceedings
the national courts have to assess of their own motion whether the contract which is at
the basis of the claim falls within the scope of the UCTD and, if so, whether the clause
is unfair, the judgment is in line with the Court’s earlier case law concerning ex officio
application of consumer law in general and the UCTD in particular.
23. Though the first judgment in which the Court stipulated that the national
courts have the power to examine of their own motion compliance with consumer
law was given in the context of the UCTD,79 it has over the years become clear that
the ECJ has a broad scope in mind concerning competence of national courts to
examine ex officio compatibility with consumer law. In Rampion, for instance, the
Court held that the provisions of the Consumer Credit Directive (87/102/EEG)
had to be applied by the national French court of its own motion.80 This case also
illustrated that ex officio assessment needs to be carried out regardless of which
party initiates the proceedings.81 This view was later confirmed by the Court in its
Radlinger judgment, which dealt with the application of Directive 2008/48/EG
77 Travaux préparatoires Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 2014–2015, nr. 54 1219/001, 3. See
also H. BOULARBAH & M.-C. VAN DEN BOSSCHE in Smaakmakers in het procesrecht, p (127) at 136.
78 See e.g. Banco Español, in which the Court engaged with order for payment proceedings. The aim
of such proceedings is similar to the aim of Article 806 BJC, namely the quick and easy settlement
of uncontested claims. M. SØRENSEN, 24. ERPL 2016(5), p 804.
79 Océano Grupo, para 29.
80 ECJ 4 October 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:575, Rampion, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-429/
05, para 69. Note that the Consumer Credit Directe from 1987 has now been replaced by Directive
2008/48/EG.
81 See also M. EBERS in 18. ERPL 2010(4), p 832.
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that replaced the Consumer Credit Directive.82 In the context of the Doorstep
Selling Directive (85/577/EEC), the Court’s judgment in Martín Martín makes
equally clear the broad scope the Court has in mind.83 Finally, reference can be
made to the cases of Duarte Hueros84 and Faber85 in the context of the Consumer
Sales Directive (1999/44/EG). In both cases, the ECJ held, inter alia, that national
courts may under certain circumstances adapt the request of the consumer.86
Moreover, the national court is obliged to assess of its own motion whether a
claimant/defendant before it can be considered as a consumer in the sense of
that directive. In this vein, the judgment in Kuijpers does not add anything new
to the settled case law.
24. When taking a closer in-depth look at the scope of the ex officio application in
the context of the UCTD, the case seems to introduce something new, though
nothing that could not have been expected. In Océano Grupo, the Court ruled that
national courts have the power to examine ex officio the compatibility of exclusive
jurisdiction clauses with the UCTD.87 In Cofidis, it became clear that this power
extends to all clauses included in contracts between a consumer and a seller or
supplier.88 The ECJ held in Mostaza Claro that national courts not only have the
power to assess compatibility of clauses with the UCTD, but are under the obliga-
tion to do so.89 The Court then extended the ex officio assessment to the question
whether the contract upon which the claim is based falls within the scope of the
UCTD, and whether the buyer can be considered as a consumer.90 In Pannon, the
ECJ concluded that the national court is not required to preclude the application of
an unfair term if the consumer, after having been informed of the unfair nature of
that clause, does not intend to invoke its unfair or non-binding status.91 Moreover,
82 ECJ 21 April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:283, Radlinger, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-377/
14, para 59.
83 ECJ 17 December 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:792, Martín Martín, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
num=C-227/08, para 36.
84 ECJ 3 October 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:637, Duarte Hueros, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=
C-32/12, para 43.
85 Faber, para 48.
86 More specifically, Mrs. Hueros, who had bought a car with a leaking, sliding roof requested before
the national court only the rescission of the contract due to the leaking roof. The national court,
however, held that the lack of conformity was minor. As such, only a reduction in price could be
justified. As the applicable Spanish procedural rules did not allow Mrs. Hueros to adapt her
request, the national court referred a question to the ECJ.
87 Océano Grupo, para 29.
88 Cofidis, paras 32–34 See also H. B. KRANS, Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht en materieel EU-recht,
pp 24–26. However, there are authors who interpret the clauses which can be assessed ex officio in
a restrictive way. See the references under Krans, fn. 18.
89 Mostaza Claro, para 38.
90 Pénzügyi Lízing, para 56, Faber, para 48.
91 Pannon, para 35.
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the Court increasingly clarified the types of procedural situations in which the
obligatory ex officio assessment of the UCTD applies. Before Kuijpers, the Court
already made clear that the analysis of the national courts’ own motion of applic-
ability and compatibility with the UCTD not only applies in ordinary proceedings,92
order for payment proceedings93 and proceedings aiming at the enforcement of
arbitral awards94 and notarial deeds,95 but also applies in appellate proceedings.96
In Kuijpers, the Court ruled that the duty to carry out an ex officio analysis of the
UCTD extends to normal default proceedings as well (i.e. default proceedings
before a judicial court). With this judgment, the Court provides guidance to what
according to some was deemed the greatest fear of most national courts: the total
absence of the consumer during proceedings.97 This finding seems to be in line
with the proposition that specific rules of national law that apply to certain types of
proceedings and prevent the national court from examining ex officio the applic-
ability of the UCTD and the unfairness of a term, will be struck down by the Court
in light of the purpose of the UCTD.98
25. Moreover, a judgment issued by the Belgian Justice of the Peace of
Oudenaarde-Kruishoutem on 11 July 2016 shows that the ECJ’s decision in
Kuijpers is not that innovative after all.99 In that case, a consumer remained
completely absent in the legal proceedings. The judge eventually ruled that, in
the context of Article 806 BJC, it was up to the adjudicating court to assess of its
own motion whether or not there was a violation of the rules on consumer credit.
Precedents thus already existed in Belgian case law that correspond with the ECJ’s
decision in Kuijpers. The only innovative element in the latter decision is that it
established an explicit externalization of the duty to asses ex officio compliance
with the UCTD in the context of default proceedings.
92 Océano Grupo, Cofidis, Banif Plus Bank.
93 Banco Español.
94 Mostaza Claro, Asturcom, Pohotovost’ and ECJ 28 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:602, Tomášová,
curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-168/15.
95 ECJ 14 March 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:164,Mohamed Aziz, curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-
415/11.
96 Asbeek Brusse.
97 A. ANCERY & M. WISSINK, 18. ERPL 2010(2), p 316; A. ANCERY, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht
(Deventer: Kluwer 2012), p 107.
98 See in this regard A. ANCERY, Ambtshalve toepassing van EU-recht (Deventer: Kluwer 2012), pp
308–313. The author distinguishes these kinds of limitations on the ex officio application of
community law from general limits to judicial activism (more specifically the power of courts to
collect on their own initiative the elements which are necessary for such an ex officio assessment
and the situation wherein a party, after having been informed about the unfair nature of a
contractual clause, decides not to appeal to the non-binding status of these clauses).
99 Justice of the Peace Oudenaarde-Kruishoutem 11 July 2016, T.Vred./J.J.P 2017(11-12), p 569,
n. R. STEENNOT, ‘Ambtshalve toepassing van de informatie-inwinningsverplichting van de
kredietgever’.
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6. Conclusion
26. Concluding, it can be argued that the Court’s decision in Kuijpers was written in
the stars. Almost ten years ago, Professor Alain Ancery and Professor Mark Wissink
wrote in this very same journal that, if one day a situation like the one at hand would
come before the ECJ, the Court would have to rule the way it now did.100
As to the reasoning of the Court, one can only conclude that the Court applies
a purposive approach by immediately turning to the principle of equivalence. This is
not really surprising, considering that Article 806 BJC lends itself to such pragmatism.
Consequently, though the judgment in itself can only be encouraged in light of
ensuring a high level of consumer protection, as prescribed by Article 38 of the
Charter, the reasoning seems to have some loose ends. It should be noted however
that this is not something new, and that there seem to be no new loose ends in this
judgment. This can be illustrated by the many references in the judgment to older case
law dealing with similar problems. The reasons of this incoherent approach can be
manifold. First, there is still no clarity on the exact content and capacity of certain
concepts used by the Court, nor on their interdependence (e.g. effet utile of EU law,
Rewe-effectiveness, the principle of effective judicial protection, effective consumer
protection). Second, the different compositions of the chambers of the Court involved
in cases concerning procedural autonomy along with the divergent academic back-
grounds of the AG’s and judges, may to some extent explain the varying approaches in
the Court’s judgments. Both reasons may constitute a vicious circle, as scholars try to
determine the exact content of and relation between different concepts based on the
AG’s opinions and the Court’s judgments. This turns out to be difficult, due to the
varying approaches and formulations given by the Court over time to these concepts.
The latter, however, may be explained by the diverging legal backgrounds of the AG’s
and judges, based on the different scholarly views on the very same concepts.
Lastly, this case illustrates the necessity to reconsider the remedies against
linguistic problems and misconceptions of a Member States’ national law. The first
problem can be illustrated by the English translation of the Court’s judgment. Instead
of (correctly) referring to default proceedings, the English version refers to appellate
proceedings in paragraph 33. It seems that the translator looked to closely at Asbeek
Brusse, to which the Court referred in the aforementioned paragraph and which was
given in the context of appellate proceedings. However, it should be remarked that (at
least) in the German and French versions of the judgment a correct translation was
used. An illustration of the second problem can be found in the dichotomy between the
power to assess ex officio compatibility with the UCTD on the one hand and the
obligation to do so on the other hand.101 A person who has no background on Belgian
100 A. ANCERY & M. WISSINK, 18. ERPL 2010(2), p 316.
101 Maybe the word ‘dichotomy’ is not the right one here, as strictly speaking a dichotomy indicates
two non-overlapping concepts. Here, as indicated above, the normal sense of the word ‘power’ does
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law may on the basis of this judgment wrongly assume that Belgian procedural law
holds a mere possibility for the national court to consider the compatibility with rules
of public policy of its own motion. This incongruence between legal reality and the
wording of the Court does not help to elucidate the haze that contours the procedural
autonomy of Member States in the context of ex officio powers/obligations of national
courts. It should be stressed that this (possible) misunderstanding finds its roots in the
formulation of the preliminary question by the Justice of the Peace of Antwerp. One
might wonder whether it belongs to the ECJ’s tasks to examine whether the terminol-
ogy used in the referred question corresponds with the legal reality in the referring
court’s national legal order. However, as is apparent from the AG’s Opinion, the
Belgian Government raised during the proceedings that Article 806 BJC should be
interpreted as holding an obligation, rather than a mere possibility.
27. By way of a general conclusion, the judgment seems to be the youngest scion in
a strand of case law wherein the Court, based on a limping reasoning, expresses its
desire for national courts to assess compatibility with consumer law of their own
motion. All in all, it’s just another brick in the wall.102
not necessarily exclude that there is an obligation. However, as the judgment was delivered in
Dutch, and the Dutch text mentions a ‘bevoegdheid’, the latter may be understood as a mere
possibility (supra).
102 Another Brick In The Wall, by Pink Floyd.
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